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1 Introduction
The paper attempts a conceptualization and measurement of preference polarization and applies the measure
to ballot data from the city council elections for the City of Cambridge, Massachussetts. An individual’s
preference is represented by a strict transitive ranking of a set of available alternatives. A population’s
preferences are represented by a distribution of individuals on the set of all possible strict transitive rankings
of these alternatives. Such a distribution is henceforth described as a preference profile. The population’s
preferences are said to be polarized if, broadly speaking, there are significantly sized clusters of individuals
whose rank orders of the alternatives are directly reverse of each other. With three candidates, for example,
the population’s preferences are completely polarized if half the people rank the candidates as A > B > C
and the other half rank them as C > B > A.
A systematic study and measurement of polarization began in the 1990’s motivated by its perceived link
to social tension and unrest and by a desire to distinguish it from (wealth or income) inequality. Amongst the
seminal papers are those by Esteban and Ray (1994), Wolfson (1994), Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) and
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2008) amongst others. In this literature, individuals in society are identified
by a measurable characteristic or attribute that may be continuous - such as income level - or discrete - such
as membership of a specific ethnic group. The state of the society is captured by a population distribution
over the attribute. Society is said to be polarized if the population distribution is characterized by clusters
with significant inter-cluster heterogeneity and intra-cluster homogeneity. That is, a society is polarized
if it is divided into significantly sized groups, such that members of the same group identify with or feel
close to each other and simultaneously feel alienated or removed from members of the other groups. In this
literature, the distance between two levels of the attribute - for example, the difference between two income
levels - provides a natural measure of the degree of ”closeness” or ”alienation” two individuals associated
with these levels feel towards each other.
To apply these existing measures of polarization, one must first define groups of individuals that are
”close” or ”far apart” on rank orders of alternatives. Traditional political economy based on location models
commonly identify an individual with his first choice in a rank order. Thus, two individuals with rank orders
A>B>C and A>C >B are ”close” under this definition, whilst two individuals with rank orders A>B>C
and B> A>C are not. The polarization measures may then be applied on a distribution of the citizens’ most
preferred alternatives (equivalently, on a distribution of plurality tallies across candidates). A large body
of recent literature studying issues such as partisan voting behavior, political posturing by candidates and
various socioeconomic implications of political polarization, implicitly or explicitly adopt such an approach
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- see, for example, Haimanko, Le Breton and Weber (2007), Krasa and Polborn (2014), Testa (2012), Woo
(2005) amongst others. However, as we show with a series of motivating examples in Section 2, such an
approach is confounding if the objective is to study preference polarization. More specifically, while a
distribution of the citizens’ most preferred alternatives may serve to study voting behavior, it is less than an
adequate tool by itself to study voters’ preferences.1 The latter requires a different approach and additional
tools. Our paper fills this methodological gap.
Moreover, many traditional models also assume all individual preferences over alternatives to be sin-
gle peaked - an assumption of convenience that avoids problems related to preference aggregation2. The
examples also show that this assumption is particularly restrictive for the study of preference polarization.
The present paper proposes and develops a way of conceptualizing and measuring preference polar-
ization. By our approach, a society’s preferences are polarized if there are significantly sized clusters of
individuals with preference orders that are reverse of each other, thus defining groups that feel most alien-
ated from each other. Characterization and measurement of such clusters serve a very important purpose.
As explained later in the paper, when such clusters are significantly present in a populace, the outcomes of
many standard voting procedures fail to capture the ”will of the people” in the sense that they leave signifi-
cant segments unhappy, despite free and fair elections. Example 3 in section 2 elaborates on this observation.
In particular, plurality or any procedure that partially uses plurality is specially vulnerable to such criticism.
As a perceived failure of a democratic process to reflect popular sentiments is often responsible for social
tension or unrest, we feel it is specially important to be able to identify such clusters if only to ascertain the
amount of confidence one can place on the outcome of a specific voting procedure.3
The main theoretical contribution of the paper is an easily implementable technique of identifying and
measuring all preference clusters of the type described above. We build on the linear algebraic approach
to voting theory, pioneered by Saari (1999; 2000a; 2000b) and sometimes described as geometric voting
1Many scholars discuss the need to distinguish between voters’ preferences and voters’ action or behaviour with respect to
polarization. Krasa and Polborn (2014), for example, notes that direct analysis of voters’ preferences on different policy issues
rather than of voting behaviour may lead to contradictory conclusions about the phenomenon of polarization in the US. They cite
several such studies.
2The assumption is primarily made to rule out existence of Condorcet cycles in the set of rankings and guarantee the existence
of Condorcet winners.
3It is beyond the scope of the present work to discuss what type of procedure should be ideally used when such clusters are
significantly present. There may be no good answer to this question as it takes us to the very heart of some of the well known
aggregation or voting paradoxes in collective choice theory. Such paradoxes arise precisely because many types of ”problem”
profiles, including the ones discussed here, are embedded in a given preference profile. All standard procedures are vulnerable to
these paradoxes in varying degrees. The paradoxes have been studied by scholars over the last three centuries, beginning with Borda
(1781), Condorcet (1785), Dodgson (1884) and Nanson (1882). Arrow’s seminal impossibility theorem (1951) brought renewed and
formal attention to these problems, in recent times. Since then, a substantial body of work has grown up on comparative studies of
procedures. For a comprehensive survey, see Balinski and Laraki (2010), Brahms (2002) and Nurmi (1996, 2002) amongst others.
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theory.4 A highlight of this approach and one of Saari’s most important contributions is the idea that a given
preference profile can be expressed as a sum of different types of structured component profiles. The profile
decomposition approach can be adapted to perform different tasks. Saari uses it to provide a deep insight
into aggregation paradoxes and why they occur. Specifically, he uses it to construct an orthogonal basis of
component profiles that span the space of all possible profiles, such that specific basis (component) profiles
influence specific voting procedures but not others (see Saari (2000b)). The purpose is to identify basis
profiles responsible for specific aggregation anomalies.5
We, on the other hand, use Saari’s approach to decompose a given profile into structured component
profiles that also admit a meaningful collective character. Specifically, the type of component profiles
described above that interests us most, is named Reverse profiles in the paper.6 Their most notable feature
is that they assign an equal number of voters to each ranking that has a specific candidate in the first and
last places. The weights of these profiles are used to measure the extent of preference polarization amongst
voters.
With a set of n candidates or alternatives, a preference profile is a n! dimensional vector. The existing
linear algebraic method of decomposing such a vector is to first characterize an appropriate set of n! orthog-
onal basis vectors and then express the given preference profile as a linear sum of these basis profiles. By
itself, this is a computationally intensive if not an impossible task, for a large n. For example, under this ap-
proach, analyzing the Cambridge City Council ballot data would require characterizing 18! orthogonal basis
profiles on an average and as many as 25! profiles for some of the years, based on the number of official
candidates alone (see Section 6 for more details). A bigger problem with this approach, however, is that
the vast majority of these basis profiles so derived, may have little or no meaningful collective character.7
Drawing upon an earlier work (Chandra and Roy, 2013), we therefore develop and use a different profile
decomposition technique that is computationally also more easily implementable.
Our decomposition method requires plurality tallies of candidates and pairwise tallies for all candidate
pairs as input. In other words, we need information on how many voters ranked a specific candidate in
the first place and how many voters prefer a specific candidate over another when any two such candidates
are compared - in essence, information of the preference profile. Thus the information requirement for
4Hodge and Klima (2005) and Balinski and Laraki (2010) provide some exposition of the linear algebraic framework, techniques
and many of Saari’s important results.
5For example, Saari identifies basis (component) profiles (well known as Condorcet profiles) that influence pairwise aggregation
procedures but not positional or sum-scoring methods.
6Young (1975) and more recently, Nurmi (1996) also contain discussions of these types of profiles. Similar profiles have been
termed Symmetric profiles in Saari (2000b). Our characterization is a little different from Saari’s in keeping with our objectives and
hence we use a different name for these profiles.
7For example, Saari (2000b) illustrates this approach for n = 4 candidates but notes that such an approach may not be useful for
n≥ 6. Also see Sections 4 and 5 for more details.
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the decomposition method is admittedly high and not easily available. There are however some political
elections which require voters to rank all candidates and the ballot data provide full information of the
voters’ preference profile.8
The Cambridge City Election Commission requires voters to rank candidates and is one of the few in
the US that requires its voters to do so. There are, however, specific problems with this ballot data that are
discussed in the text, chief of which is that voters are not required to rank all candidates. They are required
to rank at least one. Specific assumptions need to be made to tide over the difficulty that this poses for
calculating the set of pairwise tallies and these assumptions affect our empirical findings. We nevertheless
apply our techniques on this data for the period 1997-2013 as a first test of our techniques and present these
results as the first fruit of the theory of measurement of preference polarization. The empirical findings for
this period provide some evidence of recent increase in preference polarization amongst voters - an opinion
voiced by other studies and frequently by the media.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents several 3-candidate examples to
motivate and illustrate some of our main arguments. Section 3 presents the tools of geometric voting theory
used in the paper and formally introduces Reverse profiles. Sections 4 and 5 present the connection between
plurality, Reverse profiles and polarization and our main theoretical results. Finally, in Section 6, we test
our method and measures on ballot data from the Cambridge City Council, elections.
2 Motivating Examples
2.1 Example 1
The first example shows that using the distribution of citizens according to their most preferred points could
be confounding for the understanding of preference polarization. Consider the two preference profiles p and
q each with 4 voters, shown in Table ( 1)
8See Balinski and Laraki, (2010) for a list of such elections.
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Table 1:
Profile p Profile q
ranking no. of voters ranking no. of voters
(1) A > B >C 1 (1) A > B >C 1
(2) A >C > B 1 (2) A >C > B 1
(3) B > A >C 0 (3) B > A >C 1
(4) C > A > B 0 (4) C > A > B 1
(5) B >C > A 1 (5) B >C > A 0
(6) C > B > A 1 (6) C > B > A 0
The distribution of the voters on the domain of candidates, {A,B,C}, according to the voters’ most pre-
ferred points - or equivalently, the plurality tallies of the candidates - is the same for both profiles and given
by (2,1,1). It is however not reasonable to say that both electorates are equally polarized. An equal number
of voters love and hate A in p. In q on the other hand, no voter hates A. Further, although not the first choice
of two voters in the q-electorate, A is nevertheless their second best choice. Any voting procedure based
on plurality would elect A under both profiles but the outcome would generate more animosity amongst the
p-voters than amongst the q voters. The example also shows why the assumption of single-peakedness is
problematic for the study of preference polarization. The assumption excludes profiles such as p, which are
most interesting for such a study.
2.2 Example 2
Our approach to polarization consists of identifying and measuring certain structured cluster of rankings,
instead of studying the distribution of citizens according to their most preferred alternatives. Accordingly,
clusters such as p in Example 1 are characterized as ”polarized”. The next example illustrates a structured
cluster that we consider to be ”not polarized”. Consider the profile q′ which is similar to profile q in Table
( 1) above, except that two more voters with A as their first choice have been added.
Table 2:
Profile q′
ranking no. of voters ranking no. of voters
(1) A > B >C 2 (2) A >C > B 2
(3) B > A >C 1 (4) C > A > B 1
(5) B >C > A 0 (6) C > B > A 0
5
The profile q′ has the special property that under all known standard voting procedures A always emerges
as the winner and B and C are tied for second place (see Section 3 for further details). Moreover, the
aggregate ranking remains consistent over subsets of candidates, implying that it cannot be manipulated by
choice of a specific procedure or strategic participation/non-participation in the race by a candidate. For
this reason, it is reasonable to argue that there is some amount of consensus amongst the voters as to who
should be the winner. In other words, it is reasonable to use the term ”will of the people” for a cluster of
rankings such as q′, and reasonable to say that the ”will of the people” favors A. Note that even for such
a cluster, A is clearly not everybody’s first ranked candidate. The point is that A is nobody’s last ranked.
Should A be elected by some procedure, the level of discontent amongst these voters may be expected to be
less compared to amongst the p voters, say, in Example 1.
Along with Reverse profiles, profiles of this type have an important place in this paper and are formally
introduced in Section 3. We describe this type of profile as ”non-polarized” and belonging to the opposite
end of the spectrum as profile p of Example 1, in our analysis. These profiles were introduced to the social
choice literature by Saari who named them Basic profiles. He also shows that only Basic profiles have
the strong property discussed in the previous paragraph, namely procedure independency of outcomes and
consistency over subsets of candidates.
2.3 Example 3
The third example shows that profiles of the type p in Table ( 1), when significantly present in a given
preference profile, may generate election outcomes under standard procedures that are hard to justify as the
”will of the people”. Consider the profile s in Table ( 3).
Table 3:
Profile s
ranking no. of voters ranking no. of voters
(1) A > B >C 7 (2) A >C > B 6
(3) B > A >C 2 (4) C > A > B 0
(5) B >C > A 8 (6) C > B > A 5
Under plurality, A wins the election with 13 votes followed by B in second place with 10 votes and C
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in third place with 5 votes. On the other hand, if Borda Count is used, B wins with 32 points, followed by
A with 26 points and C last ranked with 24 points. Thus either A or B can be elected by an appropriately
chosen procedure, implying that a procedure may be chosen to engineer a specific outcome. We cannot
conclude what is the true ”will of the people” from the results of a voting procedure. A decomposition of
the profile provides some insight into why this may be happening and into the electorate’s preferences. The
profile s is actually a direct sum of two profiles s1 and s2 shown in Table( 4).
Table 4:
Profile s1 Profile s2
ranking no. of voters ranking no. of voters
(1) A > B >C 6 (1) A > B >C 1
(2) A >C > B 6 (2) A >C > B 0
(3) B > A >C 0 (3) B > A >C 2
(4) C > A > B 0 (4) C > A > B 0
(5) B >C > A 6 (5) B >C > A 2
(6) C > B > A 6 (6) C > B > A 1
Profile s1 is a scaled up version of the profile p in Table ( 1) - specifically, s1 = 2p. That is, the size of
the two groups who have preferences directly opposite of each others’ is now twice as big as the size under
p. Profile s2 is similar to profile q′ in Table ( 2) except that s2 favors B as the winner under any standard
procedure (instead of A, as under q′), and A and C are tied for the second place. Thus s = 2p+ q′. The
conflict between the plurality and the Borda rankings obtained from the profile s is caused by the greater
weight of the component profile s1 relative to the component profile s2, in profile s. If the weight of s1
is reduced and brought to a level sufficiently lower than the weight of s2, then the voting outcome for the
sum of the two profiles would be more aligned with the outcome for s2. And as s2 is a profile on which all
standard procedures agree, we shall see more convergence of the procedures on the sum of the two profiles.
On s = 2p+ q′, if plurality is used to determine the winner, A will win but a significant portion of the
electorate will be unhappy with the result. A is clearly a polarizing candidate. It is natural to ask, under the
circumstances, whether Borda Count (which favors candidates who are in the middle) rather than plurality
or some other method should be used to determine the winner. The paper does not seek an answer to
this question. In fact, a good answer may not exist as no procedure is clearly better than others under all
circumstances.
Some scholars have argued that if all voters are treated impartially, the component profile s1 should be
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interpreted as a complete tie across the candidates for the following reason. The rankings A > B > C and
C > B > A offset one another, being reverse of each other and supported by the same number of voters. The
rankings A >C > B and B >C > A offset one another for the same reason (see Balinski and Laraki, (2010)
for more details of this argument). Further, if s1 can be interpreted as a tie, the election winner should be
determined by s2, the tie breaker. As all procedures agree on s2, any procedure is good and the election
winner becomes B. We are not convinced about the reasonableness of this argument at present, for the
following reason. If s1 consists of most of the electorate and s2 only a small part of it, such a step magnifies
s2’s role in determining an election outcome. Clearly, a winner determined by a small part of an electorate
cannot be described as the true ”will of the people” as election outcomes are expected to be. In fact, it is not
clear what the true will of the electorate of s is, for, they are not speaking with one voice.
The linear algebraic approach to voting theory attempts to express a given preference profile as a sum
of multiple structured component profiles, including profiles of the type s1 and s2. Under the standard
approach, a complete set of n! orthogonal basis profiles (for a n candidate race) must first be constructed
- a set that includes but is not limited to profiles of type s1 and s2. This is a computationally intensive if
not impossible task. More importantly however, a large number of these component basis profiles have
little collective charater - such as s1 and s2 have - and are capable of providing little insight into voters’
preferences.
A most important result of the paper (Section 4) is that plurality tallies are determined by component
profiles of type s1 and s2 only and by nothing else. As plurality and voting procedures partially based on
plurality, are of special interest to this paper, our decomposition objective is served if we can extract all
component profiles of these two types only. Othet types of component profiles are of little interest. The rest
of the paper discusses an alternative decomposition technique therefore, that allows us to do precisely this
and is easily implementable. The weights of the s1 type profiles so extracted, provide measures of preference
polarization amongst voters.
Section 3 formally defines the various types of component profiles of interest.
3 The algebra of geometric voting theory
3.1 Preference profiles and their components
Voters have strict transitive preferences over n candidates indexed i = 1 . . .n. Hence there are n! different
ways of ranking these candidates. Assume an electorate of a given and fixed size. A profile p= (p1 . . . pn!)∈
Rn!+ is a distribution of voters across these rankings, with p j = the number of voters with preferences given
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by the jth ranking of the candidates. A profile differential p′ ∈ Rn! is the difference between two differ-
ent profiles for an electorate of a given size, implying that p′ may have negative components and that its
components add up to zero.
A preference aggregation procedure (voting procedure) attempts to obtain an aggregate or social ranking
of the candidates based on a profile. Standard procedures fall into two classes, pairwise procedures and
positional or sum-scoring procedures.
Pairwise procedures are based on pairwise comparision of the candidates. Condorcet’s ”successive
reversal” and the ”maximal agreement” procedures, Kemeny’s method, Copeland’s method are commonly
used examples of such procedures. We begin by counting the number of voters in p, who rank i over j and
call this, i’s pairwise tally against j. The normalized pairwise score difference between i and j is defined as,
ai j =
(i’s tally against j− j’s tally against i)
total number of voters
(1)
Thus if ai j > 0, then i beats j in a pairwise comparison and if ai j < 0, then j beats i. Further, note that,
ai j = −a ji and as ai j is normalized, −1 ≤ ai j ≤ 1. A pairwise procedure constructs a social ranking of the
candidates from the set of pairwise score differences {ai j}i 6= j,i< j.
Positional or sum-scoring methods assign fixed points to a candidate depending on his/her position in
an individual’s ranking. The aggregate or social ranking is obtained by the sum of these points across all
individuals. Plurality and the Borda Count are commonly used examples. The plurality method involves a
voter awarding one point to his/her first ranked candidate and zero to all other candidates placed in other
positions in his/her ranking. Plurality tallies are the sum of all the points awarded by all the voters. The
Borda Count (BC) assigns n−1 points to the first ranked candidate of each voter, n−2 points to the second
ranked candidate and so on and 0 to the last ranked candidate. The aggregate ranking is based on the sum
of all points awarded by the voters. Amongst the positional methods, Borda Count has the unique and
interesting feature that it is a pairwise as well as a positional method as the Borda ranking is equivalent
to ranking the candidates according to the sum of their normalized pairwise score differences against other
candidates - that is, ranking the candidates by assigning the ith candidate a score of ∑ j 6=i ai j.9
An analytically useful type of profile with a collective character is the Kn ∈Rn!+ profile. A Kn profile has
one voter for each possible ranking, thus representing an equitable or uniform distribution of voters across all
possible rankings. A Kn profile yields a tied outcome across all candidates under any preference aggregation
9See Saari 2000b for details.
9
procedure. Moreover, the relative ranking of candidates are not affected by addition or subtraction of a
scaler multiple of a Kn profile to any other given profile, under any procedure. Such an operation changes
the aggregate tallies but not the differences in tallies between any two candidates.10
Let V denote the total number of individuals or voters. It is useful to view any given profile p as a
perturbation from a Vn! K
n profile - that is, as a perturbation from an initial uniform distribution of voters.
Thus p can be expressed as Vn! K
n + p′ for some profile differential p′ ∈ Rn!. For example, consider the
profile s = (7,6,2,0,8,5) of 28 voters described in Table 3. s can be expressed as 286 K
3 + s′ where s′ =
(146 ,
8
6 ,−166 ,−286 , 206 , 26).
To understand the usefulness of this approach, first note that as Vn! K
n has completely tied outcomes for
all candidates under any procedure, the profile differential p′ yields the same social ranking of the candidates
as p under any procedure. That is, under any procedure, the tallies of the candidates under p and p′ may
differ but the aggregate ranking of the candidates obtained are the same. Thus for analytical purposes, a
profile p and an appropriate profile differential p′ are equivalent.
Secondly, under this approach, a profile p of an electorate of size V is viewed as being obtained from
the (uniformly distributed) Vn! K
n profile by moving voters away from specific rankings and adding them to
other specific rankings. The negative components of p′ indicate which rankings have suffered depletion and
the positive components of p′ indicate which rankings have experienced gains. For example, the profile
s = 286 K
3 + s′ of Table 3 is obtained from a 286 K
3 profile by moving voters away from the rankings (3) and
(4) (under which A is middle ranked) and adding them to the other rankings (under which A is first or last
ranked). Figuratively speaking, any profile p is a result of ”padding” and ”thinning” of specific rankings of
an uniform distribution of voters. The various types of component profiles discussed in the paper that admit
a collective character are structured ”padding” and ”thinning” of a weighted Kn profile.
In developing the decomposition methodology, we use the corresponding profile differential p′ for any
p, rather than p itself, as the analytical building block. The advantage of this approach is that as a profile
differential is orthogonal to Kn, a decomposition of p′ does not include neutral Kn effects (that merely
changes tallies without affecting results). Alternatively, as a profile differential is a profile with the number
of voters normalized to zero, the decomposition of p′ (rather than p) allows us to focus on the pure act of
padding and thinning that is responsible for the structure of p, rather than its mass.
10There are many other types of profiles with this feature, that are not discussed here. Saari(2000a,b) describes the set of all such
profiles as the Universal Kernel.
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3.2 Basic profiles
The next step is to understand the structure of the type of profile illustrated in Example 2 that, by our
definition, represents an electorate that is non-polarized. To understand this structure, first fix a candidate,
say i. Take a Kn profile and shift a voter from each ranking which has i last ranked and add the voter to a
ranking which has i first ranked, taking care not to add more than one such voter to a ranking. The profile
p(i) thus obtained equals Kn + p′(i) where the profile differential p′(i) has one voter for each ranking that
has i top ranked, (-1) voter for each ranking that has i bottom ranked and 0 voter for each ranking that has i
ranked somewhere in the middle.
We describe the profile differential p′(i) thus obtained as a Basic profile (after Saari) favoring candidate
i and denote it by Bni . Following our earlier explanation, p(i) and p
′(i) = Bni yield the same social ranking of
the candidates and are hence analytically interchangeable. Thus the term Basic profile may be used to refer
to either. A 4-candidate Basic profile favoring candidate A is illustrated in Table ( 5).
Table 5:
Reference ranking B41 Reference ranking R
4
1
1. A > B >C > D (1) 13. D >C > B > A (-1)
2. A > B > D >C (1) 14. C > D > B > A (-1)
3. A >C > B > D (1) 15. D > B >C > A (-1)
4. A >C > D > B (1) 16. B > D >C > A (-1)
5. A > D >C > B (1) 17. B >C > D > A (-1)
6. A > D > B >C (1) 18. C > B > D > A (-1)
7. B > A >C > D (0) 19. D >C > A > B (0)
8. B > A > D >C (0) 20. C > D > A > B (0)
9. C > A > B > D (0) 21. D > B > A >C (0)
10. C > A > D > B (0) 22. B > D > A >C (0)
11. D > A > B >C (0) 23. C > B > A > D (0)
12. D > A >C > B (0) 24. B >C > A > D (0)
A society represented by Bni has candidate i as some voter’s first choice and nobody’s last choice. Further,
the number of voters who rank candidate i first is greater than the number of voters who rank any other
candidate j, first. Thus under any preference aggregation procedure, the aggregate ranking for this profile
will have the i-th candidate top ranked and everyone else tied in the second place. There are (n−1) linearly
independent such Basic profiles in a n candidate field.
Moreover, any preference profile that can be expressed as a linear sum of Basic profiles only, yield the
same social ranking under any aggregation procedure. Consider a given profile p that can be expressed as,
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p = Vn! K
n+a1Bn1+a2B
n
2+ . . .+anB
n
n, where ai’s are non-negative constants.
Under a pairwise procedure, the social ranking on p is obtained from the pairwise scores, {ai j}i6= j,i< j.
On p, the difference ai j can be shown to be equal to ai− a j, the difference in the weights or coefficients
of the Bni and B
n
j profiles. Thus under any pairwise procedure, in the aggregate ranking, the relative rank
of i and j is determined by the sign of ai−a j alone. If ai− a j > 0, i is ranked above j in the aggregate or
social ranking. If ai−a j < 0, i is ranked below j and if ai−a j = 0, i and j have the same place in the social
ranking under any pairwise procedure. Thus, the aggregate ranking thus obtained has the same linear order
as the set of coefficients {ai} and is therefore transitive. Moreover, under any pairwise procedure, the social
ranking remains consistent over subsets of candidates.
Under a positional procedure, for the profile p, the difference in the positional tallies between any two
candidates, can be shown to be equal to k(ai−a j), where k is a constant and uniform for all candidate pairs,
(i, j). Thus, under any positional procedure, in the aggregate ranking, the relative rank of two candidates
will depend only on their relative Basic profile weights, ai and a j and very importantly, not on any other ak.
In other words, the aggregate ranking obtained is the same under all positional procedures and consistent
over subsets of candidates. Moreover, the aggregate ranking is the same as that obtained under any pairwise
procedure and hence the same as the linear order on the set of coefficients, {ai}.
Profiles such as p pose the least challenges for democratic governance as the social ranking on p cannot
be engineered by an appropriate choice of procedure or manipulated by candidates through strategic par-
ticipation in races. Voters making up a Bni profile collectively like the i-th candidate more than any other
candidate and are completely indifferent across the others. By a slight stretch of the imagination and perhaps
abuse of terms, we may describe the Basic profile Bni as representing the preferences of the voters making up
the ”popular base” of candidate i. Thus, the social ranking on p reflects the relative sizes of the candidates’
”popular bases”.
3.3 Reverse profiles
The next step is to understand the structure of the type of profile p illustrated in Example 1 that, by our
definition, represents an electorate that is polarized. We begin with a definition.
Definition 1 Fix an integer k, such that 2≤ k ≤ n+12 . For k < n+12 , a generic i-inclined Reverse profile, Rni ,
has 1 voter for each ranking in which the i-th candidate is first and last ranked, (-1) voter for each ranking
in which he/she is k-th ranked and to the reversal of this ranking and 0 voters for all other rankings. If
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k = n+12 , the profile has 1 voter for each ranking in which the candidate is first and last ranked, (-2) voters
for each ranking in which the candidate is k-th ranked and 0 voters for all other rankings.
To understand the structure of the Reverse profile Rni , assume n > 3 and fix k = 2. R
n
i has the same
structure and tallies as a Kn profile with a voter moved from each ranking in which i is either second or
(n−1)th ranked and added to a ranking in which i is first or last ranked. In words, such a profile is obtained
by padding the rankings in which i is placed at the two extremes and thinning the rankings in which i is
placed somewhere in the middle.
REMARK 1: Note that the value of k determines which rankings with i in the middle are thinned and the
voters moved to the extremes. If k = 2, voters are moved away from the rankings in which i is in the second
or (n−1)th place. If k = 3 voters are moved away from rankings in which i is in the third or (n−2)th place.
For Rni to be a proper profile differential, it is important that some designated rankings with i in the middle
of the rankings have (-1) voters assigned to them. Hence these profiles are defined for a fixed k. However,
the specific choice of k does not matter for our main results. Note for example, that the plurality ranking
of the candidates under Rni is the same whatever be the choice of k. We use the adjective ”generic” in the
definition to indicate that we have a degree of freedom in the characterization of these profiles.
REMARK 2: Adding a Kn profile to a Rni profile shows that each ranking that has i first and last ranked
are supported by the same number of voters. As a matter of fact the statement may be generalized to say
that each ranking and its reverse in the Kn +Rni profile is supported by the same number of voters. Hence
we name these profiles, Reverse profiles. As Section 4 shows, the social ranking of the candidates for Bni
and Rni are the same under plurality but R
n
i demonstrates extreme preference polarization amongst voters.
Hence, the weights of the Rni profiles in a given profile may be used to construct measures of preference
polarization.
REMARK 3: Generic Reverse profiles are similar but not identical in structure to Symmetric profiles
defined by Saari (2000b) - hence, our use of a different name. Saari’s construction is designed for his
specific objective of explaining all possible voting paradoxes under all procedures. Specifically, in his case,
positional tallies need to be expressed as deviations from the Borda Count (2000b, Proposition 1) as the
weights of the Basic profiles are not directly available.11 The approach introduces many different types of
11In the absence of direct information about the weights of the Basic profiles, the Borda Count can be used as a surrogate, because
Borda scores are influenced only by Basic profiles.
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component profiles that do not always have meaningful collective characters, partly to facilitate the task of
profile decomposition in the absence of direct information about the weights of Basic profiles. Our approach
includes a technique for extracting the weights of the Basic profiles directly and hence we are able to bypass
such problems.
Table ( 6) illustrates the R41 and R
4
2 profiles for a four candidate field. The next section describes the
connection between plurality tallies of candidates and the different Reverse profiles and the first of our main
results.
Table 6:
Reference ranking R41 R
4
2 Reference ranking R
4
1 R
4
2
1. A > B >C > D (1) (-1) 13. D >C > B > A (1) (-1)
2. A > B > D >C (1) (-1) 14. C > D > B > A (1) (-1)
3. A >C > B > D (1) (-1) 15. D > B >C > A (1) (-1)
4. A >C > D > B (1) (1) 16. B > D >C > A (1) (1)
5. A > D >C > B (1) (1) 17. B >C > D > A (1) (1)
6. A > D > B >C (1) (-1) 18. C > B > D > A (1) (-1)
7. B > A >C > D (-1) (1) 19. D >C > A > B (-1) (1)
8. B > A > D >C (-1) (1) 20. C > D > A > B (-1) (1)
9. C > A > B > D (-1) (-1) 21. D > B > A >C (-1) (-1)
10. C > A > D > B (-1) (1) 22. B > D > A >C (-1) (1)
11. D > A > B >C (-1) (-1) 23. C > B > A > D (-1) (-1)
12. D > A >C > B (-1) (1) 24. B >C > A > D (-1) (1)
4 Plurality and Reverse profiles
For any fixed k, there are n (first place) Reverse profiles for a n-candidate field, related by ∑ni=1 Rni = 0. The
following proposition lays out the properties of these profiles, for the given k.
Proposition 1 For a given k,
1. The set of {Rni }i=1...n profiles are not pairwise orthogonal to each other and span a (n−1) dimensional
subspace of the profile space.
2. The set of {Rni }i=1...n profiles are pairwise orthogonal to the set of {Bni }i=1...n profiles.
3. The plurality tallies of Bni and R
n
i profiles are identical, with candidate i receiving (n−1)! points and
every other candidate receiving −(n− 2)! points each. The pairwise scores for each candidate pair
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under a Rni profile is a complete tie.
Proof: See Appendix II.
The set of positional tallies of all candidates under any sum-scoring or positional aggregation method
is a n dimensional vector in Rn+, with each component of the vector representing the total points received
by a candidate under the specific method. A main implication of Proposition 1 is that although the Reverse
profiles are orthogonal to the Basic profiles, the plurality tallies for both profiles lie in an identical direction
in Rn+. This is not surprising given the tone of our discussions relating to Examples 1 and 2. In fact, the
statement formally proves for n candidates our earlier observation that a distribution of plurality tallies is
unable to identify which type of population it is obtained from - a non-polarized or a polarized one.
The proofs make clear that the specific choice of k does not matter for the plurality properties of Rni
discussed in Proposition 1. Without loss of generality therefore, we shall characterize all Reverse profiles
by fixing k = 2, for the rest of the paper.
The following theorem provides the foundation for our decomposition methodology and is the first main
result of this paper.
Theorem 1 Let p be any given profile. The difference in the plurality tallies of any two candidates, for p,
can be fully explained by Basic and generic Reverse profile components.
Proof: Differences in tallies under any specific procedure, including plurality, are not affected by neutral
profile components such as Kn which influences these tallies uniformly for all candidates. As shown earlier,
Basic profile components of p influence the difference in the plurality tallies of any two candidates. The
residual difference in the plurality tallies can therefore be explained by profile components orthogonal to
Basic profiles that influence plurality tallies. We want to characterize the set of such orthogonal profiles in
the following way. Each such component profile (like a Basic profile) must affect the plurality tally of a
specific candidate but not others - implying that for each such component profile, all candidates other than
the specific one must be tied under plurality. Profiles orthogonal to Basic profiles that affect the plurality
tally of a specific candidate must have an equal number of voters for each ranking with the candidate in the
first and last places. The structure of the remaining rankings (which have the specific candidate in other
positions) does not matter, so long as for each such component profile, (1) the other candidates are tied
under plurality - implying a symmetric distribtuion of voters across rankings with other candidates in the
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first place and (2) the component proflie is a profile differential - the total number of voters is zero. Such
profiles are therefore fully characterized by generic Reverse profiles. ∆.
A main implication of Theorem 1 is that differences in plurality tallies of all candidate pairs, for any
profile p, can be explained by its Basic and Reverse profile components. No other type of structured compo-
nent profile need be considered to explain these differences. Thus, suppose we have a given profile p and a
vector of plurality tallies for the candidates based on p. The vector of plurality tallies may be fully explained
by assuming that the given profile is a linear combination of a Kn profile, n Basic profiles and n Reverse
profiles. By the theorem, the difference in the plurality tallies of any two candidates i and j is determined
by the Basic and Reverse profile weights, ai,a j,ri and r j and by nothing else.
Related to the previous implication is that plurality tallies may be used to extract the weights {ri}ni=1.
However, these weights cannot be identified from the plurality tallies alone as the latter are also influenced
by the weights of the Basic profiles {ai}ni=1. It is therefore important to first chracterize the exact relationship
between these tallies and the coefficients of the Basic and Reverse profiles. The next most important result
of the paper does precisely this.
Let p be any given profile and let τ= (τ1 . . .τn) denote the vector of plurality tallies of the candidates.
Corollary 1 The plurality tally differences between any two candidates, τi− τ j, can be uniquely decom-
posed into two components, one determined by Basic profiles and the other by Reverse profiles. Specifically,
for any candidate pair (i, j), τi− τ j = n(n−2)!((ai−a j)+(ri− r j)
Proof: By Theorem 1, we can assume without loss of generality that the given profile can be expressed
as, p = ∑ni=1 aiBni +∑
n
i=1 riR
n
i +
V
n! K
n as no other type of component profile contributes to plurality tallies.
Note moreover that only (n−1) of the Basic profiles and (n−1) of the Reverse profiles are independent.
From Proposition 1, the tallies of Bni and R
n
i are in identical direction, for all i. Define ti as a vector
with (n− 1)! as its i-th component and −(n− 2)! as all the other components. Denote 1 = (1,1, . . .1), a
n-component vector. Then the plurality tallies for p are given by
τ=
n
∑
i=1
(ai+ ri)ti+
V
n
1 (2)
Denote by α= ∑ni=1(ai+ ri)(n−2)!− Vn . A simple manipulation yields,
τ= n(n−2)!ω−α1 (3)
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where the n-dimensional vector ω= {ai+ ri}ni=1. The difference in the plurality tallies for the (i, j) pair
is therefore given by,
τi− τ j = n(n−2)!((ai−a j)+(ri− r j) ∆ (4)
See Appendix for details of some of the specific steps of the proof. Corollary 1 shows that if the
differences (ai−a j) are known, then the coefficients {ri}ni=1 can be obtained from plurality tallies, subject
to a normalization.
The next section discusses an easily implementable technique of extracting the Basic profile weights
{ai}ni=1. The technique is based on an earlier result in Chandra and Roy, (2013).
5 Isolating Basic and Reverse component profiles
Our objective is to extract the weights, {ai}ni=1, without constructing a set of n! orthogonal basis profiles. A
Theorem from Saari (2000a) provides a pathway to this. Saari’s result says that pairwise score differences,
{ai j}i6= j,i< j, for all candidate pairs are fully determined by Basic profile and another class of component
profiles known as Condorcet profiles. The result is reported below,
Saari (Proposition 5, 2000a): Pairwise score differences, ai j are the sum of two orthogonal components
- a component contributed by the set of Basic profiles and another component contributed by the set of all
Condorcet profiles. Other types of profiles contribute nothing towards these values.
Although a comprehensive discussion of Condorcet profiles is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief
introduction is in order, as Saari’s theorem is the foundation for a result in Chandra and Roy (2013) that
shows how Basic profile weights may be extracted from the pairwise score differences.
5.1 Condorcet profiles and pairwise scores
Begin by first specifying a reference ranking of the candidates, say 1 > 2 > 3 . . . > n, and index this ranking
as (1). Consider the two sets of cyclic rankings generated by the reference ranking (1), listed in Table ( 7).
The set of rankings in the first column of the table, cn(1) is described as the Condorcet n-tuple generated by
the reference ranking (1). The second set of rankings, listed in column 2 of the table, ρ(c(1))n, is another
set of cyclic rankings that is the reverse of the first set. The sets cn(1) and ρ(c(1))
n are thus two specific sets
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of cyclic rankings of the candidates with the feature that each ranking in the set ρ(c(1))n is a reversal of a
ranking in cn(1).
Table 7:
cn(1) ρ(c(1))
n
1 > 2 > 3 . . . > n n > n−1 > n−2 . . . > 1
2 > 3 > 4 . . . > 1 n−1 > n−2 > n−3 . . . > n
3 > 4 > 5 . . . > 2 n−2 > n−3 > n−4 . . . > n−2
. . . . . .
n > 1 > 2 . . . > n−1 1 > n−1 > n−2 . . . > 2
A Condorcet profile Cn(1) associated with the reference ranking (1), is a profile that has one voter for
each ranking in cn(1) and (-1) voter for each ranking in ρ(c
n
(1)) and zero voter for each remaining ranking
in the profile. The first or reference ranking of the set cn(1) uniquely characterizes a Condorcet profile. A n
candidate field has (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles - a very large number. Condorcet profiles thus vastly
outnumber the Basic and Reverse profiles. A reason why constructing a set of n! orthogonal basis profiles
is practically nearly impossible is the difficulty of characterizing these distinct Condorcet profiles for an
arbitrary n.
The Cn(1) profile can be obtained from a K
n profile by moving a voter away from each of the ρ(cn(1))
rankings and adding it to each of the cn(1) rankings. Alternatively, a Condorcet profile is obtained from a
Kn profile by adding a voter to each ranking in the set of cyclic rankings that form a Condorcet n-tuple and
taking a voter away from the reversal of this ranking.
A Condorcet profile has the feature that each candidate is placed in each position by exactly the same
number of voters. Thus under any positional method, inlcuding plurality, such a profile produces a complete
tie. However it generates an intransitive ranking of the candidates under pairwise methods.
Saari’s (2000a) result says that the pairwise score difference, ai j, for the candidate pair (i, j), is a sum of
two components, aTi j and a
C
i j, such that the component a
T
i j is determined by the weights of the Basic profiles
and the component aCi j is determined by the weights of all the Condorcet profiles. The Appendix provides
additional explanations and illustration with 3 candidates.
The result shows that it may be possible to extract the Basic profile weights {ai} from the pairwise
scores by using linear algebraic techniques. However, once again the curse of dimensionality makes a direct
application of this result difficult for any arbitrary n as the first step would require characterizing all the
directional vectors of the pairwise score differences generated by the (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles.
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There is no currently available computational algorithm to characterize these for any arbitrary n.
Our earlier paper, Chandra and Roy (2013), describes an alternative approach that avoids this curse of
dimensionality. The next subsection describes this technique and its potential usefulness for the present
work.
5.2 Extracting weights of Basic and Reverse profiles
Assume a given or initial set of pairwise scores, {a0i j}, for all candidate pairs. The Chandra and Roy (2013)
method consists of a simple set of addition operations on the set of initial scores to form a set of revised
pairwise scores. Denote by {a1i j}, the revised pairwise scores. The {a1i j}’s are obtained from the {a0i j}’s by
the following algorithm,
a1i j = a
(0)
i j +
1
2 ∑k 6=i, j
(a(0)ik +a
(0)
k j ),∀i, j (5)
Take the given pairwise score difference, a(0)i j , between candidates i and j. Revise this score difference
by a weighted average of all pairwise score differences between i and all other candidates (except j) and
between j and all other candidates (except i). The main result of Chandra and Roy (2013) shows that
the revised scores, {a1i j}, are a scaler multiple of the differences in the weights of the Basic profiles - in
other words, the scores, {a1i j}, are free of the Condorcet components, {aCi j}. It is reported as the following
proposition without the proof. The interested reader is referred to the original paper.
Proposition 2 (Chandra and Roy (2013)) The revised pairwise scores, {a1i j}, for all candidate pairs satisfy
the following property: a1i j = (1+
1
2(n−2))(ai−a j) or alternatively, ai−a j =
a1i j
(1+ 12 (n−2))
.
Although a complete proof of this result is beyond the scope of the present paper, very briefly, the
result follows from the strong additive transitivity property of Basic profiles described earlier and a specific
property of the components, {aCi j}, generated by the Condorcet profiles- namely, ∑ j 6=i aCi j = 0 for all i. The
last property is equivalent to an intransitive aggregate ranking over the candidate pairs.12
12The algorithm ( 5) is suggested by the following intuition: Condorcet profiles generate an intransitive social ranking over
candidates because pairwise scores, by their nature, do not use the full information contained in the set of multilateral rankings that
is the profile. Instead, they use partial information about the profile in the form of selective binary components of these rankings.
In Saari’s words, pairwise scores do not recognize or use the transitivity property of the individual rankings, for the notion of
transitivity is irrelevant over two candidates. The algorithm ( 5) essentially attempts to restore some of these lost information
contained in the original multilateral rankings. The pairwise score difference for a candidate pair (i, j) is revised by placing a
positive weight on the scores of i against other candidates (the aik ’s) and the scores of j against other candidates (the ak j). In
other words, the difference between i and j is re-assessed by using all possible indirect evidence concerning i and j against other
candidates. If i won massively against j but lost against k, whereas j won massively against k, our method will reduce the margin
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The computational advantage of this method and the reason for its use in the present work is that forming
the revised scores, {a1i j}, require only simple addition operations, as opposed to characterizing the direc-
tional vectors of the pairwise score differences generated by the (n−1)!2 distinct Condorcet profiles. The
weights of the Basic proifles may be extracted by first forming the scores, {a1i j}, and then dividing them by
the uniform constant (1+ 12(n−2)).
Normalized Basic profile weights
The algorithm ( 5) enables us to extract the differences ai−a j for all (i, j) pairs from the given pairwise
scores but not the coefficients ai themselves. A normalization is needed in light of the Section 6 application
(There are only (n−1) independent Basic profiles).
In principle, any one of the coefficients ai, i = 1 . . .n may be set to zero to obtain the remaining (n−1)
coefficients. From the point of view of constructing measures, however, it is convenient to choose the nor-
malizing coefficient (the zero coefficient) in such a way that the weights of the remaining (n−1) independent
Basic profiles are non-negative. We use the following steps to select the normalizing coefficient.
As the differences (am−an) are ordered, choose the (m,n) pair for which this difference is maximized.
Suppose that max(m,n)(am−an) = (ai−a j). Note that (ai−a j)≥ 0 and therefore (a j−ai) = min(m,n)(am−
an)≤ 0. Select a j to be the normalizing coefficient, that is, set a j = 0. Obtain the values of all the remaining
ais from the differences.
Note that a j = 0 implies ai ≥ 0. Note that ∀m 6= j, (am−a j) = (am−ai)+(ai−a j). Since (a j−ai)≤
(am− ai) ≤ (ai− a j), it follows that (am− a j) ≥ 0, implying am ≥ a j = 0. Thus all other coefficients are
positive.
Normalized Reverse profile weights
Once the differences ai−a j are obtained from pairwise scores using our technique, the differences ri−r j
can be obtained from equation ( 4) and plurality tally differences τi− τ j. As with the Basic profile weights,
any one of the ri coefficients can be normalized to zero to obtain the other coefficients. To obtain a set of
non-negative ri’s therefore, we use the same steps as above. Note however, that, in general, the value of j
for which a j is normalized to zero may not be the same as the value of k for which rk is normalized to zero.
In other words, the two normalizations are independent.
by which i won against j. These revisions are meant to recapture the spirit of the original multilateral rankings which contain
information about how each candidate stands within the entire group of candidates in voters’ preferences, rather than how each
candidate stands relative to only a specific another.
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REMARK 4: It is important to clarify what the weights, ai,ri exactly mean. In particular, such weights
in general cannot be interpreted as a ”share or proportion” of the electorate. As described in Section 3, any
given profile is viewed as a padded and thinned Vn! K
n profile or a perturbation from a uniform distribution
of voters, where V is the number of voters. A weight measures the ”thickness” of the padding and thinning
performed relative to the Vn! profile, to obtain the given profile. Suppose a profile can be expressed as
p = Vn! K
n + aiBni . If ai is equal to
V
n! , we conclude that the entire profile has the same structure as a B
n
i
profile. Thus, when a given profile is a linear combination of many Basic and Reverse profiles, the relative
values of the ai and ri coefficients provide direct measures of the importance or strength of these component
profiles relative to the others. The above normalizations are equivalent to setting the weakest of the Basic
and Reverse profiles to have zero weights.
We illustrate our decomposition technique with two 3-candidate examples.
5.3 Example 4
The following preference-profile comes from the election of a president of the Social Choice and Welfare
Society and reported in Balinski and Laraki (2010).
Table 8:
Rankings No. of voters Rankings No.of voters
1. A > B >C 13 4. C > B > A 8
2. A >C > B 11 5. C > A > B 11
3. B >C > A 9 6. B > A >C 0
It is easy to check that C is the Condorcet winner, the majority rule ranking is C > A > B and the Borda
ranking is A > C > B. The pairwise scores are a12 = 9/26, a13 = −1/13 and a23 = −2/13. The plurality
tallies are A = 24,B = 9 and C = 19 inducing the plurality ranking A >C > B.
Applying the Chandra-Roy algorithm, the revised pairwise scores are a(1)12 =
10
26 , a
(1)
13 =
1
52 , and a
(1)
23 =
−1952 . The weights of the Basic profiles are obtained from the differences, aˆ12 = a1−a2 = 2078 , aˆ13 = a1−a3 =
1
78 , aˆ23 = a2−a3 =−1978 . As max(ai−a j) = a1−a2, we normalize a2 = 0, implying a1 = 2078 and a3 = 1978 .
The Basic profile favoring A has a slightly greater weight than the one favoring C. To obtain the coefficients
of the reverse profiles, note that r1−r2 = 370/78, r1−r3 = 129/78 and r2−r3 =−241/78 using the formula
of Theorem 3. As the maximum difference is r1−r2, we set r2 = 0 and obtain r1 = 370/78 and r3 = 241/78.
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Note that for the profile of voters depicted in Table( 10), the plurality and the Borda rankings of the
candidates are the same. Further note that the differences a1− a3 and r1− r3 have the same sign. These
two observations are by no means unconnected. The next section, Section 6, provides more insight and
details into the connection between the differences ri− r j, ai−a j and potential conflicts between plurality
and Borda rankings of candidates. So far as this example is concerned, it suffices to point out that although
the weight r1 is greater than the weight r3 and that this favors A under plurality, the extent of polarization
present amongst the voters is not significant. In particular, polarization does not pose a problem for the
democratic election of the President as either method elects the same candidate.
A more striking feature of this profile and a bigger problem than polarization is the fact that the Con-
dorcet winner is different from the Borda/plurality winner. Although a detailed discussion of this feature is
beyond the scope of this paper, the decomposition results above show that a significant presence of Con-
dorcet profiles is responsible for this. The Condorcet components obtained from the pairwise scores and the
revised pairwise scores are, ac12 = a12−a(1)12 = 9/26−10/26 =−1/26; ac13 = a13−a(1)13 =−1/13−1/52 =
−5/52 and ac23 = a23−a(1)23 =−2/13+19/52= 11/52. These account for the difference between the Borda
ranking and the majority rule ranking, specifically the switch from A to C as the winning candidate.
5.4 Example 5
We use our decomposition method to gain insight into a scenario described in the opening paragraph of the
paper. Under this scenario, half the population has ranking A > B > C and the other half has the reverse
ranking C > B > A. Consider the following preference profile.
Table 9:
Rankings No. of voters Rankings No.of voters
1. A > B >C 10 4. C > B > A 10
2. A >C > B 0 5. C > A > B 0
3. B >C > A 0 6. B > A >C 0
Note that the pairwise score differences are all zero. Thus using our technique the weights of the Basic
profiles are all zero - that is a1 = a2 = a3 = 0. The plurality scores have A and C tied and B losing to both
by 10 votes. Applying equation ( 4) and associated normalization, we have r2 = 0 and r1 = r3 = 10/3.
Thus the above profile is a sum of a R31 and a R
3
3 profile of equal weights.
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6 Measuring preference polarization
Remark 4 explains that the weights {ri} and {ai} measure the ”thickness” of the padding and thinning
required relative to a uniform distribution of voters, to obtain a given set of plurality tallies from a given
profile. The weights of the Reverse profiles, {ri}, therefore may be used to construct measures of polar-
ization. First of these measures is the average ri coefficient over all candidates, denoted r¯, and its variant,
r¯w, which denotes this average over the winning candidates in an election (The Cambridge City Council has
nine members - see below). A second useful measure is the ratio of r¯ to the average Basic profile coefficient,
a¯. The ratio r¯a¯ provides an aggregate measure of how strong the Reverse profiles are relative to Basic profiles
and thus to what extent polarized preferences play a part in determining the plurality outcome. We use two
variants of the ratio measure. The ratio r¯a¯ measures this influence across all the candidates and the variant,
r¯w
a¯w
measures it across the winning candidates.
Finally, Theorem 2 establishes the following relationship between the plurality tally differences and the
differences between the Basic and Reverse profile coefficients.
(τi− τ j) = n(n−2)!((ai−a j)+(ri− r j)) (6)
Thus, the plurality tally difference (τi− τ j) for the candidate pair (i, j) and (ai− a j) have the same
sign if ri−r jai−a j > −1 and opposite signs if
ri−r j
ai−a j < −1, when (ai− a j) 6= 0. Therefore, when (ai− a j) 6= 0
and ri−r jai−a j < −1, the relative plurality ranking of the (i, j) pair is a strong reversal of the relative ranking
according to the pair’s Basic profiles. Since the Borda ranking of the candidates is equivalent to ranking
them according to their ai’s, when
ri−r j
ai−a j <−1, the relative plurality ranking of the pair is a reversal of their
relative ranking under the Borda Count. Specifically, when this is the situation, the candidate that is higher
ranked according to plurality must be significantly more polarizing than the other, because the higher rank
under plurality is due to the weight of the Reverse profile.
When (ai− a j) = 0 but (ri− r j) is strictly positive or negative, the relative plurality ranking of the
(i, j) pair is a weak reversal of the relative ranking according to their Basic profiles. In this situation, the
two candidates have the same Borda rank but one of them is higher plurality ranked because of the stronger
Reverse profile weight. Thus the ratios ri−r jai−a j or the quantities (ri−r j) (when ai−a j = 0) provide information
about how polarizing specific candidates are relative to others. We count the number of distinct pairs whose
relative rank under plurality is a strong or weak reversal of their relative rank under Borda and denote by Ψ
the proportion of such candidate pairs in the total number of pairs. Ψ provides an aggregate measure of the
extent to which the plurality method is vulnerable to preference polarization.
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6.1 Results from the Cambridge City Council Elections
In this section, we test our method and measures on ballot data from the Cambridge (Massachussetts) City
Council elections over the period 1997-2013. Elections are held every two years providing us with nine
years of data.
The nine members of the City Council are elected under a proportional representation (PR) method over
several counts of the ballots. Under this method a candidate is elected if he/she wins a certain proportion
of the votes, called a quota. The quota is determined by dividing the total number of valid ballots by ten
(the number of candidates to be elected plus one) and adding one to the result. The first count entails
determining the plurality tallies of all the candidates. All candidates who reach the quota after the first count
are declared elected. Any votes they receive beyond the quota are denoted surplus votes. Surplus votes are
transferred to the second choice candidates on the surplus ballots. A formula determines which ballots are
selected as surplus ballots. After surplus votes are transferred, candidates who have fewer than fifty tallies
are eliminated and their votes are transferred to the next in preference. A new ranking is established of the
continuing candidates, after this. The candidate with the lowest number of tallies after the two transfers is
declared defeated and his/her ballots are transferred to the next continuing candidate marked on each ballot.
Once a candidate reaches the quota, no more ballots are transferred to him/her. The process continues till all
nine members are elected.
The present paper does not attempt a comprehensive critique of this specific voting procedure. Our
specific objective is to uncover the weights of the Basic and Reverse profiles from the ballot data which
consists of individual voters’ rankings of the candidates. Our analysis may, however, provide some insight
into the specific PR method as well. Reverse profiles influence the plurality tallies of the first count, thereby
influencing the rest of the PR process and the final outcome. Significant coefficients of these profiles suggest
polarization and casts doubt on any method based on plurlaity, for determining winners.13
The data set has certain limitations. The traditional model of social choice assumes voters to have
strict preferences over all candidates. The Cambridge City electoral laws do not require voters to rank all
candidates. Voters must rank at least one of them for the first place and are free to rank as many of the others
as they like. On an average there are 18 or19 official candidates, on the ballot, out of which 9 city council
members are elected. Most voters rank about only 4 or 5 candidates. Thus the major limitation of the data
set is that many of the official candidates are not ranked by many of the voters.
13Although not the main focus of this paper, Condorcet profiles are known to influence the aggregate rankings of the continuing
candidates when candidates who have already fulfilled the quota or the bottom ranked candidates are dropped and their votes are
transferred to the next ranked candidate on the ballots. Our method of extraction of the Reverse profile coefficients, also provide a
measure of the size of the Condorcet profiles as a by-product and to that extent is useful.
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A second limitation of the data set is that under the electoral laws, voters also have the right to vote
for unofficial candidates of their choice by writing their names in a designated space on the ballot. These
candidates, described as write-in candidates, appear in most cases to be people well known within the very
small group of voters who have ranked them but not widely known outside this circle. There is, however,
one exception to this observation that happened in the year 2009. In the year 2009, a popular candidate who
was successfully elected multiple times previously, failed to file her nomination papers on time and hence
was not included in the official list of candidates. The candidate participated as a write-in candidate and
ended up being elected. For our analysis for the year 2009, we treated this candidate as an official rather
than as a write-in candidate. With the exception of 2009, every election year, there are typically 7-9 write-in
candidates who are ranked (anywhere on the ballot) only by a very small set of individual voters.
The presence of write in candidates who are ranked by only very few and the fact that most voters rank
only about 4 or 5 official candidates out of 18 or 19 cause the set of individual voters’ rankings to be incom-
plete. As our decomposition method requires pairwise score differences for all candidate pairs, assumptions
need to be made about how the candidates who are not ranked by a specific voter, stand relative to each
other in that voter’s preferences. We make the following two assumptions about the official candidates that
we consider reasonable to overcome this difficulty with the data set. First, we assume that if a voter has not
ranked a specific candidate, A (say), then the voter strictly prefers all the candidates that he or she has actu-
ally ranked to the candidate A. In other words, unranked candidates are ranked below the ranked candidates
for any voter. Secondly, if a voter has not ranked two candidates A and B, we assume that the voter prefers
A to B with probability half and B to A with probability half. So far as calculating pairwise score differences
are concerned, this is equivalent to distributing all voters who have not ranked a specific pair (A,B), equally
between A and B. These assumptions do reduce the accuracy of the pairwise score differences that we use
to extract the Basic profile weights and to that extent affect the estimates of the Reverse profile weights.
However, we consider these assumptions to be the most reasonable under the circumstances and present our
results as a first attempt to apply the methods and measures discussed in the paper.
Instances of a write-in candidate, rather than an official candidate, being ranked first on the ballot,
were very few for all the years, with the exception of the 2009 elections discussed above. We exclude the
ballots where a write-in candidate is ranked first from our analysis14, but retain the ballots where a write-in
candidate is placed in between two official candidates.
A third but minor limitation of the data set is that, for many of the elections prior to 2005, we found
14We essentially do this to reduce the number of candidates, so that the ratio τi−τ j)n(n−2)! does not vanish at the specified place after
decimal, in our numerical calculations. This does not affect our qualitative results.
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several ballots with multiple candidates ranked in the same position (”overvotes”). The problem of overvotes
is significantly less beginning with 2005, because of a new practice put in place by the Election Commission
that automatically ejects all such ballots and gives the voters another chance to redo their ballots. In keeping
with the traditional model of social choice (that assumes strict transitive ranking), we excluded all ballots
with multiple candidates placed in the same position. Thus, for the years 1997-2003, on an average about
8-9% of the total ballots were discarded. For the years 2005-2011, this percentage is about 1-2%. The
combined discards (for all of the reasons explained above) account for some slight differences between our
plurality tallies for the candidates and the official plurality tallies of the candidates, after the first count.
Specific instances of such discrepancies are noted in the tables for each election year.
Tables 11-20 presents the numerical results of our analysis. Table 11 presents the values obtained for the
various measures of polarization discussed in Section 5, for all the years. Figure 1 plots these values. Tables
12-20 provide the Basic and Reverse profile coefficients for all the candidates along with their aggregate
rankings based on plurality, the Borda Count and the weights of their Basic profiles, for specific years. The
main findings are summarized below.
6.2 Summary results for the period 1997-2013
With the exception of 1997, the values of r¯, r¯a¯ , r¯w and
r¯w
a¯w
are generally higher for the period 2005-2013 than
for the period 1999-2003. The ratio, r¯a¯ , r¯w, in particular shows steady increase from 2001. Moreover, after
2005, polarized preferences seem to have played a generally bigger role in determining the set of winners,
compared to before 2005, as evidenced by the values of r¯w and the ratio r¯wa¯w - although the ratio seems to
have dropped off after 2009.
The proportion of relative ranking reversals under plurality, Ψ does not show a specific trend over the
years but is generally significant at an average of 36% across all years.
6.3 Specific results for each election year
This subsection points out specific oddities in the election outcome for each year - oddities that may be
attributed to the presence of strong Reverse profile components that favor or disfavor specific candidates.
1997
About 9% of the ballots were discarded. Candidate C12, Borda and ai ranked 2nd, was edged out by
Candidates C06, C13, C14 and C15, all of whom were Borda and ai ranked below C12, in the first round of
counting, because the plurality tallies of the latter were boosted by stronger Reverse profiles, as evidenced
by the higher ri values relative to r12. C12 got elected in the second round after a transfer of surplus votes
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from the first round. C14, Borda and ai ranked 6th, edged out C01, Borda and ai ranked 5th, in the first
round of counting because of a stronger Reverse component profile. C01 eventually got elected in the third
round of counting. C06, Borda and ai ranked 7th, is plurality ranked above C04, Borda and ai ranked 1st,
because r6 > r4.
1999
About 9.3% of the ballots were discarded. Our findings include: Borda and ai 6th ranked Candidate
C08 (r8 = 0.068 approx), edged out Candidate C18 who was Borda and ai 1st ranked (r18 = 0) in the first
count. C18 eventually was elected in the 13th round. C05 who was Borda and ai ranked 4th and C19 who
was Borda and ai ranked 5th similarly trailed behind C08 in the first count and eventually got elected in the
14th and 13th rounds respectively. C20 who was Borda and ai 2nd ranked did not get elected.
2001
About 6.3% of the ballots were discarded. We find that C12 who was Borda and ai ranked 7th was
elected in the first count, whilst C16 who was Borda and ai ranked 2nd was elected in the 13th count. C17,
C03 and C18 who were Borda and ai ranked 4th, 5th and 6th respectively (that is ranked before C12) were
elected in the 7th, 9th and 14th counts. In contrast to what happened in 1999, however, all of the first nine
Borda and ai ranked candidates were eventually elected to the Council. (Explain further)
2003
About 8.8% of the ballots were discarded. As it happened in 2001, there is a remarkable consistency
between the first nine Borda and ai rankings and the set of candidates who eventually got elected. A notice-
able fact is that candidate C16 who is Borda and ai ranked 3rd got elected in the 13th round, after candidates
C02, C04, C13 and C20, all of them Borda and ai ranked lower than C16, got elected in earlier rounds. C16
has a lower ri coefficient compared to all of them. Candidate C06 was plurality, Borda and ai first ranked
and also the candidate with the lowest ri coefficient.
2005
About 3.4% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Amongst the most noticeable findings are: C05
who was Borda and ai ranked 6th got elected in the first round, whereas, C16 who was Borda and ai ranked
1st got elected in the 11th round. C16 got elected in later rounds than C17, C03, C04, C18 and C13, all of
whom were Borda and ai ranked lower than him/her. Note that r16 = 0. whereas the ri of all these candidates
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are higher and significantly so in case of C05. Very remarkably, C12 who was Borda and ai ranked 7th did
not get elected, whereas, C10 who was Borda and ai ranked 11th got elected. C10 has a significantly higher
ri coefficient compared to C12. Even more interestingly, C12 ran and was elected in 1999, 2001 and 2003.
In all these three years he/she showed remarkable consistency in the Borda/ai rankings relative to the other
candidates, being always placed 7th or 8th. C10 ran but lost in 2003 and interestingly enough also had a
significantly high ri coefficient in 2003.
2007
About 1.03% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Some interesting findings are: C13 who was
Borda and ai ranked 1st got elected in the 9th round whereas Candidates C01, C15 C06 and C11, all of
whom were Borda and ai ranked lower but had higher ri coefficients (significantly so, for C11, C06 and
C15), got elected in earlier rounds. Also notable was that Candidate C13 who ran in 2001, 2003, 2005 and
2007, had low ri coefficients in 2001 and 2003 and had ri = 0 in 2005 and 2007. C16 who was Borda and
ai ranked 9th was defeated but C11 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th but had a higher ri coefficient, was
elected. Two candidates C03 and C14, who have been elected in 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 were
defeated in 2007. Further both had low, sometimes 0, ri coefficients in all the years they were elected. In
2007 when they were defeated, their ri coefficients were significantly higher compared to the earlier years,
specially so for C03. Thus both candidates became significantly more polarizing figures in 2007 compared
to what they were earlier. The year 2007 also marks the beginning of a period during which a significant
number of candidates appear with high ri coefficients, some of them amongst the winners.
2009
Only 0.8% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. Write-in candidate, WI01 is designated the 21st
official candidate in our table. Amongst the findings are: A significant number of candidates have high
ri coefficients, some of them amongst the winners...Candidate C19 who was Borda and ai ranked 4th and
Candidate C18 who was Borda and ai ranked 9th were not elected. Candidates WI01 who was Borda and ai
ranked 21st and Candidate C02 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th were elected. Candidate WI01 had won
as an ”official” candidate in 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007, had ri coefficients generally less than 0.1
during these years. In 2009 his/her ri was the highest at 0.5 approx. WI01 also had the lowest ai coefficient
at 0. Four out of the nine elected candidates had ri coefficients that were significantly higher compared to
pre-2007 norms.
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2011
About 1.3% of the ballots cast this year were discarded. A significantly large number of candidates had
significantly higher ri coefficients compared to pre-2007 norms. Only three out of eighteen candidates had ri
coefficients less than 0.1 and four candidates had ri coefficients higher than 0.4. Six out of the nine winners
had significant ri coefficients. Other interesting findings are, Candidate C12 who was Borda and ai ranked
4th and Candidate C17 who was Borda and ai ranked 9th were not elected. Instead Candidate C04 who was
Borda and ai ranked 11th and Candidate C16 who was Borda and ai ranked 10th were elected. Candidate
C13 who was Borda and ai ranked 2nd was elected in the 13th round whereas C15 and CC05 who were
Borda and ai ranked lower but had higher ri coefficients were elected in earlier rounds.
2013
Only 0.05% of the ballots were discarded. As in 2011, a significantly large number of candidates had
significantly higher ri coefficients compared to pre-2007 norms including amongst the winners. C08 edged
out C21 in the plurality tallies because of a stronger Reverse proifle component favoring him/her. C21 did
not get elected despite being Borda higher ranked than C08.
7 Appendix
7.1 Condorcet profiles, pairwise scores with 3 candidates
In a 3-candidate election, there are 3! = 6 possible rankings of the candidates A, B and C. Let the rankings
be numbered as follows:
Table 10:
1. A > B >C 4. C > B > A
2. A >C > B 5. B >C > A
3. C > A > B 6. B > A >C
Denote A as candidate 1, B as candidate 2 and C as candidate 3. The Basic profiles are given by,
B31 = (1,1,0,−1,−1,0), B32 = (0,−1,−1,0,1,1), and B33 = (−1,0,1,1,0,−1) and note, B31+B32+B33 = 0.
Each B3i has the same election outcomes as B
3
i +K
3 where K3 = (1,1,1,1,1,1). As K3 has one voter
favoring each ranking, it does not influence any election outcome. Note that B31 +K
3 = (2,2,1,0,0,1).
Under the profile B31 +K
3 = (2,2,1,0,0,1), A wins over B or C under any pairwise or postional voting
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procedure. B and C are tied under any procedure. Thus everyone in this group of voters likes A best and is
indifferent between the others.
There is a unique reference ranking and only one distinct Condorcet profile for a 3-candidate field. The
Condorcet 3-tuple c3(1) and its reversal set ρ(c(1))
3 are the set of rankings in the table below.
Table 11:
c3(1) ρ(c(1))
3
A > B >C C > B > A
B >C > A A >C > B
C > A > B B > A >C
The Condorcet profile for a 3-candidate field is described by the vector, C3 = (1,−1,1,−1,1,−1).
As the number of candidates increases, the dimension of the voters’ profile and the number of distinct
Condorcet profiles gets large very quickly. In a 4-candidate field the number of all possible rankings of the
candidates is 24, implying that the Basic and the Condorcet profiles are 24-dimensional vectors. There are
4 Basic profiles (three of which are independent) and 3 distinct Condorcet profiles. In a 6-candidate field
there are 6 Basic profiles and 60 distinct Condorcet profiles, each being a 6!-dimensional vector.
There are three possible pairwise scores differences in a 3-candidate field and hence the set of pairwise
score differences is a 3-dimensional cube with each side given by the interval [−1,1]. A vector of pairwise
score differences in this cube is represented as a = (a12,a13,a23). The set of pairwise score differences with
4 candidates is a 6-dimensional cube.
The vector of pairwise score differences, a, generated by the three Basic profiles are T 31 = (1,1,0),
T 32 = (−1,0,1), and T 33 = (0,−1,−1). Under B31, A unanimously beats B and C who are tied. Hence in T 31 ,
a12 = a13 = 1 and a23 = 0. It is easy to check that these three vectors are linearly dependent and hence span
a 2-dimensional subspace of the 3-dimensional cube [−1,1].
With three candidates, the unique Condorcet profile generates the pairwise score differences vector
q = (a12,a13,a23) = (1,−1,1). q illustrates the well known Condorcet triplet that A unanimously beats B,
B unanimously beats C and C unanimously beats A. In a 4-candidate field there are three distinct Condorcet
profiles and hence three such 6-dimensional directional vectors (see Saari 2000a for description). In a 5-
candidate field there are twelve 10-dimensional directional vectors. As the number of distinct Condorcet
profiles increase very rapidly with the candidates, characterizing the directional vectors for these profile
becomes a long and involved process. This is one reason why direct profile decomposition is difficult to
implement if n > 4.
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Suppose that an electorate can be described by a combination of Basic and Condorcet profiles, p =
aB31 + bB
3
2 + cB
3
3 + dC
3, where a, b, c and d are any constants and the vectors B31, B
3
2, B
3
3, and C
3 are as
defined above.
It is easy to check that the number of voters favoring each possible ranking within the profile are as
follows.
Table 12:
ranking no.of voters ranking no. of voters
A > B >C (a− c+d) C > B > A (−a+ c−d)
A >C > B (a−b−d) B >C > A (−a+b+d)
C > A > B (−b+ c+d) B > A >C (b− c−d)
The pairwise election tallies are calculated to be (A : B) = ((2a− 2b+ d) : (2b− 2a− d)), (A : C) =
((2a−2c−d) : (2c−2a+d)), and (B : C) = ((2b−2c+d) : (2c−2b−d)). Note that the pairwise tallies
depend on the relative weights of the two relevant Basic profiles and the weight of the Condorcet profile.
Further each pairwise score difference is a direct sum of two components - one attributable to the Basic
profiles and the other to the Condorcet profile. For example, the pairwise score difference for the (A,B) pair
is (4a−4b+2d) (A’s tally minus B’s tally). The component attributable to the Basic profiles is 4a−4b and
the component attributable to the Condorcet profile is 2d.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
For this proof, we index the candidates by the lower case letters, i = 1 . . .n, as we do in the text and name
the candidates with upper case letters, A,B . . .N, whenever necessary for exposition. Thus the ith candidate
is named I and the jth candidate J.
Part 1: Assume k = 2 to start with. Also, without loss of generality, consider the pair (Rn1,R
n
2). R
n
1
has non-zero voters for A in the 1-st, 2-nd, (n− 1)-th and n-th places. Rn2 has non-zero voters for B in the
1-st, 2-nd, (n−1)-th and n-th places. The inner product of (Rn1)T and Rn2 have non-zero components for all
rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the 2-nd, (n−1)-th or n-th place (2) A is in the 2-nd
place and B is in the 1-st, (n−1)-th or n-th place (3) A is in the (n−1)-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or
n-th place and (4) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, 2-nd or (n−1)-th place. In each of these cases
(a total of twelve cases), A and B can be placed in their positions in (n−2)! ways. The relevant components
of Rn1 and R
n
2 belong to the set {1,−1}. The non-zero components of the inner product equal
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−(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!
−(n−2)!+(n−2)!− (n−2)!− (n−2)! =−4(n−2)!
Hence Rn1 and R
n
2 are not orthogonal. By way of illustration, for n = 3 and n = 4, (R
3
1)
T R32 = −6 and
(R41)
T R42 =−8. The argument extends to all pairs of Rni profiles for k = 2.
Next note that all the previous steps of the proof apply directly without any changes to any k < n+12 .
Now suppose we choose k = n+12 which can only happen if n is odd. Note that the candidate, I, can be in
the k-th place in (n−1)! rankings and that half of these rankings are reversals of the other half. Each such
ranking has (-2) voters by construction. The inner product of (Rn1)
T and Rn2 have non-zero components for
all rankings in which (1) A is in the 1-st place and B is in the n+12 -th or n-th place (2) A is in the
n+1
2 -th place
and B is in the 1-st, or n-th place (3) A is in the n-th place and B is in the 1-st, n+12 -th place. The non-zero
components of the inner product equal
−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)!−2(n−2)!+(n−2)!−2(n−2)! = −6(n−2)!
which is not 0. Hence the non-orthogonality claim is true for any k and for all pairs of generic Reverse
profiles.
Consider the sum ∑ni=1 Rni for k = 2. Only four out of these n profiles at a time contribute non-zero
voters for each ranking. Two of the profiles contribute (1) voter each for the first and last places. The other
two profiles contribute (-1) each for the 2-nd and (n− 1)-th places. Hence the sum is 0. Using similar
argument, it is clear that the sum of any (n− 1) profiles out of the n profiles is not 0. Hence the set spans
a (n− 1) dimensional subspace, for k = 2. The steps apply directly without any changes to any k < n+12 .
When k = n+12 , three out of these profiles contribute non-zero voters for each ranking at a time. Two of the
profiles contribute (1) voter each for the first and last places. The profile contributes (-2) each for the n+12 -th
place. Hence the sum is 0
Part 2: Consider the inner product of (Rni )
T and Bni , for any given k. This has non-zero components for
all rankings in which (1) candidate I is in the 1-st place and (2) candidate I is in the n-th or last place. As
there are (n−1)! rankings in which candidate I is 1-st ranked and another (n−1)! rankings in which he/she
is last ranked, the non-zero components equal (n− 1)!.(1).(1)− (n− 1)!.(1).(−1) = 0. Hence this pair is
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orthogonal to each other.
Next assume that k = 2 and consider the inner product of (Rni )
T and Bnj , where i 6= j. This has non-
zero components for all rankings in which (1) candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the 2-nd place (2)
candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the (n−1)-th place (3) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the
2-nd place and (4) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the (n−1)-th place. The non-zero components
equal −(n−2)!− (n−2)!+(n−2)!+(n−2)! = 0. Hence these two vectors are orthogonal and the claim
is true.
Again, the arguments extend directly without any changes for any k < n+12 . When k =
n+1
2 , the inner
product has non-zero components for all rankings in which (1) candidate J is in the 1-st place and I is in the
n+1
2 -th place (2) candidate J is in the n-th place and I is in the
n+1
2 -th place. The non-zero components equal
−2(n−2)!+2(n−2)! = 0. Hence claim is true for any given k.
Part 3: Under a Bni profile, candidate I is ranked first (n−1)! times and hence receives as many points.
Candidate J receives non-zero votes only for rankings in which he/she is ranked first and candidate I is
ranked last. There are (n− 2)! such rankings each with (-1) voter. Thus every other candidate receives
−(n− 2)! points. Under a Rni profile, with k = 2, candidate I is ranked first (n− 1)! times and receives as
many points. Candidate J receives non-zero votes for every ranking in which (1) J is first ranked and I is
second ranked (2) J is first ranked and I is (n−1)-th ranked (3) J is first ranked and I is n-th ranked. There
are (n−2)! rankings in each category. J receives (-1) for each ranking in the first two categories and (1) for
each ranking in the last category. Hence J receives −(n−2)! points.
These tallies remain unchanged for any k < n+12 . For k =
n+1
2 , candidate J receives non-zero votes for
every ranking in which (1) J is first ranked and I is n+12 -th ranked (2) J is first ranked and I is n-th ranked.
There are (n−2)! rankings in each category. J receives (-2) for each ranking in the first category and (1) for
each ranking in the last category. Hence J receives −(n−2)! points.
The total number of voters in a Bni +K
n profile is 2(n−1)!+(n−2)(n−1)! = n!. The total number of
voters in a Rni +K
n profile is 2(n−1)!+2(n−1)!+(n−4)(n−1)!= n! for n > 3. The normalized plurality
scores can be derived using the previous steps. Under a Rni profile, each ranking and its reversal has the same
number of voters. Hence pairwise scores are a complete tie for each candidate pair.
7.3 Step details of Corollary 1
The profile is given by p = ∑ni=1 aiBni +∑
n
i=1 riR
n
i +
V
n! K
n. The plurality tally of candidate i, is (ai + ri)(n−
1)!−∑nj 6=i, j=1(a j + r j)(n− 2)!+ Vn . Arranging terms and using the defintions of ti and 1, we then get
equation( 2).
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Next note that,
(ai+ ri)(n−1)!−
n
∑
j 6=i, j=1
(a j + r j)(n−2)!+ Vn
= (n−1)(n−2)!(ai+ ri)−
n
∑
j 6=i, j=1
(a j + r j)(n−2)!+ Vn
= n(n−2)!− (
n
∑
j=1
(a j + r j)(n−2)!− Vn )
The definitions of ω and α then yields equation (3).
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Table 13: Summary results for the period 1997-2013
Years r¯ Std(ri) r¯a¯ r¯w
r¯w
a¯w
Ψ
1997 0.203 0.153 0.94 0.070 0.20 0.40
1999 0.173 0.110 0.88 0.071 0.24 0.61
2001 0.193 0.146 0.77 0.061 0.16 0.23
2003 0.153 0.125 0.78 0.029 0.09 0.34
2005 0.224 0.171 0.85 0.089 0.22 0.34
2007 0.215 0.145 0.89 0.111 0.32 0.38
2009 0.240 0.146 0.92 0.150 0.43 0.32
2011 0.240 0.151 1.06 0.126 0.38 0.26
2013 0.253 0.118 1.38 0.172 0.26 0.24
Figure 1: Summary results for the period 1997-2013
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Table 14: 1997 elections: a2 = 0, r4 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 3rd C01 6 5 0.378680243 5 0.040926482 15
D C02 10 19 0 19 0.419606726 1
E, 14th C03 9 8 0.33295654 8 0.086650186 12
E, 1st C04 2 1 0.419606726 1 0 19
D C05 15 18 0.001354005 18 0.418252721 2
E, 1st C06 1 7 0.3532176 7 0.066389126 13
E, 11th C07 11 11 0.136258229 11 0.283348497 9
D C08 18* 17 0.041575915 17 0.378030811 3
D C09 14 14 0.094198304 14 0.325408422 6
D C10 16 16 0.066836377 16 0.352770349 4
D C11 8 9 0.265489111 9 0.154117615 11
E, 2nd C12 7 2 0.401894381 2 0.017712344 18
E, 1st C13 5 3 0.387539479 3 0.032067247 17
E, 1s C14 4 6 0.354014073 6 0.065592653 14
E, 1st C15 3 4 0.384610907 4 0.034995819 16
D C16 12 13 0.108161096 13 0.31144563 7
D C17 17* 12 0.07116184 12 0.348444886 5
D C18 19* 15 0.126075622 15 0.293531104 8
D C19 13 10 0.188120905 10 0.231485821 10
Average 0.216407966 0.20319876
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C08 is ranked 17th, C18 is ranked 18th and C17 is ranked19th officially, after the first count.
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Table 15: 1999 elections: a3 = 0, r18 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 11th C01 2 3 0.344874753 3 0.02540773 22
E, 14th C02 4* 10 0.24075288 10 0.129529603 15
D C03 19 24 0 24 0.370282483 1
D C04 24 23 0.05359921 23 0.316683273 2
E, 14th C05 5* 4 0.336589054 4 0.033693429 21
E, 13th C06 3 8 0.266562658 8 0.103719824 17
D C07 20 18 0.098987012 18 0.271295471 7
E, 1st C08 1 6 0.302314402 6 0.067968081 19
D C09 18 19 0.097422518 19 0.272859965 6
D C10 11 16 0.134397888 16 0.235884595 9
D C11 14 20 0.091334976 20 0.278947506 5
D C12 22 22 0.064651179 22 0.305631304 3
E, 14th C13 10 7 0.279454437 7 0.090828046 18
D C14 21 21 0.087428112 21 0.282854371 4
D C15 16* 15 0.151139721 15 0.219142762 10
E, 14th C16 7 11 0.217337913 11 0.15294457 14
D C17 13 12 0.189360568 12 0.180921915 13
E, 13th C18 8 1 0.370282483 1 0 24
E, 13th C19 6* 5 0.332297621 5 0.037984862 20
D C20 9 2 0.349856661 2 0.020425822 23
D C21 12 14 0.165788278 14 0.204494205 11
D C22 17 13 0.187533868 13 0.182748615 12
D C23 15* 9 0.255204783 9 0.1150777 16
D C24 23 17 0.108824095 17 0.261458388 8
Average 0.196916461 0.173366022
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C02 is ranked 5th, C05 is ranked 6th and C19 is ranked 4th, officially, after the first count. C15 is ranked
15th and C23 is ranked 16th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 16: 2001 elections: a1 = 0, r5 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 18 19 0 19 0.443075497 1
E, 1st C02 3 3 0.414859265 3 0.028216232 17
E, 9th C03 4 5 0.381725656 5 0.061349841 15
D C04 16 18 0.028673663 18 0.414401835 2
E, 1st C05 1 1 0.443075497 1 0 19
D C06 15* 17 0.093947775 17 0.349127722 3
D C07 14* 12 0.202280531 12 0.240794966 8
D C08 12 13 0.127292042 13 0.315783455 7
D C09 13 15 0.105527986 15 0.337547511 5
D C010 11 11 0.268463485 11 0.174612012 9
E, 15th C011 10 8 0.3472017 8 0.095873797 12
E, 1st C012 2 7 0.350806973 7 0.092268524 13
D C013 17 16 0.095946023 16 0.347129474 4
D C014 9 10 0.275782371 10 0.167293126 10
E, 15th C015 8 9 0.319238258 9 0.123837239 11
E, 13th C016 6 2 0.417958958 2 0.025116539 18
E, 7th C017 7 4 0.388129682 4 0.054945816 16
E, 14th C018 5 6 0.373479872 6 0.069595626 14
D C019 19 14 0.120370398 14 0.322705099 6
Average 0.250250533 0.192824964
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C06 is ranked 14th, C07 is ranked 15th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 17: 2003 elections: a5 = 0, r6 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 13 13 0.142250572 13 0.204323903 8
E, 9th C02 2 5 0.322525198 5 0.024049277 16
D C03 8 16 0.074460729 16 0.272113746 5
E, 12th C04 7* 7 0.30908604 7 0.037488436 14
D C05 19 20 0 2 0.346574475 1
E, 1st C06 1 1 0.346574475 1 0 20
D C07 20 18 0.02376686 18 0.322807616 3
D C08 18 17 0.056103618 17 0.290470857 4
D C09 12 14 0.125982373 14 0.220592102 7
D C10 15 12 0.161708137 12 0.184866339 9
D C11 17 19 0.018420412 19 0.328154063 2
E, 13th C12 9 8 0.299381604 12 0.047192871 13
E, 12th C13 6* 4 0.325076691 4 0.021497784 17
D C14 11 11 0.165160442 11 0.181414033 10
E, 13th C15 5 9 0.254813264 9 0.091761211 12
E, 13th C16 10 3 0.337468958 3 0.009105517 18
D C17 14 15 0.074738277 15 271836198 6
E, 10th C18 3 2 0.344553732 2 0.002020743 19
D C19 16 10 0.181930175 10 0.164644301 11
E, 12th C20 4 6 0.317334567 6 0.029239908 15
Average 0.194066806 0.152507669
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C06 is ranked 6th and C13 is ranked 7th, officially, after the first count.
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Table 18: 2005 elections: a2 = 0, r16 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 13 17 0.027062433 17 0.459551143 2
D C02 18 18 0 18 0.486613576 1
E, 9th C03 3 3* 0.434377909 3 0.052235667 16
E, 9th C04 2 5 0.409046092 5 0.077567484 14
E, 1st C05 1 6 0.405791705 6 0.080821871 13
D C06 12 12 0.150867032 12 0.335746544 7
D C07 15 16 0.066018547 16 0.420595029 3
D C08 17 15 0.071293136 15 0.41532044 4
D C09 14 13 0.094715069 13 0.391898507 6
E, 11th C10 9 11 0.230661564 11 0.255952012 8
D C11 16 14 0.09189506 14 0.394718516 5
D C12 11 7 0.393973868 7 0.092639708 12
E, 10th C13 7 4 0.424111421 4 0.062502155 15
E, 11th C14 8 8 0.37030372 8 0.116309856 11
D C15 10 10 0.257144827 10 0.229468749 9
E, 11th C16 6 1 0.486613576 1 0 18
E, 5th C17 4* 2 0.467411315 2 0.019202262 17
E, 10th C18 5 9 0.35467301 9 0.131940566 10
Average 0.263108905 0.223504671
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
C03 is ranked 4th and C17 is ranked 3rd, officially, after the first count.
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Table 19: 2007 elections: a8 = 0, r13 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 1st C01 1 2 0.423140965 2 0.033877992 15
E, 9th C02 7 4 0.364579521 4 0.092439435 13
D C03 12 14 0.051708995 14 0.405309961 3
D C04 13 13 0.07408695 13 0.382932006 4
E, 10th C05 6 7 0.268489717 7 0.18852924 10
E, 7th C06 3 6 0.339173315 6 0.117845642 11
D C07 14 12 0.123069604 12 0.333949352 5
D C08 15 16 0 16 0.457018956 1
E, 9th C09 5 3 0.39536522 3 0.061653736 14
D C10 16 15 0.051553466 15 0.40546549 2
E, 8th C11 4 10 0.242232672 10 0.214786284 7
E, 10th C12 8 8 0.265616995 8 0.191401962 9
E, 9th C13 9 1 0.457018956 1 0 16
D C14 10 11 0.19453085 11 0.262488106 6
E, 6th C15 2 5 0.355915612 5 0.101103345 12
D C16 11 9 0.262945546 9 0.19407341 8
Average 0.241839274 0.215179682
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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Table 20: 2009 elections: a21 = 0, r14 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
D C01 18 19 0.100249059 19 0.399637763 3
E, 17th C02 10 10 0.264162972 10 0.235723819 12
E, 1st C03 1 2 0.470059345 2 0.029827446 20
D C04 17 18 0.109561943 18 0.390324849 4
D C05 15 15 0.159057867 15 0.340828924 7
E, 15th C06 6 7 0.331563707 7 0.168323085 15
D C07 16 16 0.153278278 16 0.346608513 6
E, 16th C08 4 6 0.422708423 6 0.077178369 16
D C09 13 14 0.171308213 14 0.328578579 8
D C10 21 20 0.094439678 20 0.405447114 2
D C11 20 17 0.141528433 17 0.358358358 5
E, 16th C12 7 8 0.284016159 8 0.215870633 14
E, 17th C13 8 5 0.42332809 5 0.076558702 17
E, 1st C14 2 1 0.499886792 1 0 21
D C15 14 12 0.219237094 12 0.280649697 10
D C16 9 11 0.250363459 11 0.249523333 11
E, 1st C17 3 3 0.451838744 3 0.048048048 19
D C18 12 9 0.283706325 9 0.216180466 13
D C19 11 4 0.445796987 4 0.054089804 18
D C20 19 13 0.189624148 13 0.310262644 9
E, 17th WI01 5 21 0 21 0.499886792 1
Average 0.260272177 0.239614615
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
44
Table 21: 2011 elections: a8 = 0, r1 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 1st C01 1 1 0.460430347 1 0 18
E, 9th C02 4 3 0.393626618 3 0.066803729 16
E, 14th C03 6 8 0.280711324 8 0.179719023 11
E, 13th C04 7 11 0.230369018 11 0.230061328 8
E, 1st C05 3 6 0.334550108 6 0.125880239 13
D C06 13 15 0.051566073 15 0.408864274 4
D C07 16 16 0.027006804 16 0.433423542 3
D C08 18 18 0 18 0.460430374 1
D C09 12 12 0.115530661 12 0.344899686 7
D C10 17 17 0.02006979 17 0.440360557 2
E, 14th C11 9 7 0.300004895 7 0.160425452 12
D C12 11 4 0.354312208 4 0.106118139 15
E, 13th C13 5 2 0.41154957 2 0.048880777 17
D C14 14 13 0.112446766 13 0.347983581 6
E, 1st C15 2 5 0.342165439 5 0.118264907 14
E, 14th C16 8 10 0.258557632 10 0.201872714 9
D C17 10 9 0.270571534 9 0.189858812 10
D C18 15 14 0.061579989 14 0.398850358 5
Average 0.223613821 0.236816526
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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Table 22: 2013 elections: a7 = 0, r3 = 0
Status Candidates Plurality rank Borda rank ai Rank by ai ri Rank by ri
E, 16th C01 4 12 0.190746034 12 0.24559919 14
E, 17th C02 7 19 0.086814448 19 0.349530775 7
E, 1st C03 1 1 0.436345223 1 0 25
D C04 16 15 0.15585912 15 0.280486103 11
E, 17th C05 8 10 0.236453246 10 0.199891977 16
D C06 21 23 0.031583211 23 0.404762012 3
D C07 14 25 0 25 0.436345223 1
E, 15th C08 2 7 0283429729 7 0.152915495 19
E, 17th C09 9 11 0.213169799 11 0.223175425 15
E, 17th C10 5 5 0.291589963 5 0.14475526 21
D, C11 19 22 0.040900191 22 0.395445032 4
D C12 17 17 0.099520648 17 0.336824575 9
D C13 25 24 0.028738607 24 0.407606616 2
D C14 24 20 0.079603916 20 0.356741308 6
D C15 22 21 0.076115675 21 0.360229549 5
D C16 10 9 0.239360864 9 0.196984359 17
D C17 12 4 0.294452571 4 0.141892652 22
E, 16th C18 6 3 0.351547204 3 0.08479802 23
D C19 13 13 0.190313942 13 0.246031282 13
E, 16th C20 3 6 0.284865534 6 0.151479689 20
D C21 11 2 0.369384494 2 0.066960729 24
D C22 18 14 0.159792956 14 0.276552267 12
D C23 15 8 0.242038933 8 0.19430629 18
D C24 23 18 0.087332058 18 0.349013165 8
D C25 20 16 0.112577923 16 0.323767301 10
Average 0.183301 0.253043772
E, . = elected, count; D = defeated
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